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BANKRUPTcY-DEBTS NOT DISCHARGEABLE-WRONGFUL SALE
UNDER TRUST RECEIPT.-An automobile dealer purchased a car with
moneys borrowed from a finance company, giving back to the lender,
as security, a bill of sale, a chattel mortgage, a promissory note, and
a trust receipt. The car was sold by an agent of the dealer with-
out the consent of the lender. Sales without such consent had been
customary. The dealer, having filed a petition in bankruptcy and
having been discharged, the lender contends that his claim for con-
version of the car is not dischargeable, since it constituted embezzle-
ment or defalcation of a fiduciary 1 and wilful and malicious injury
to property 2 within Section 17 of the Bankruptcy Act. Held, that
the claim was dischargeable. There was no fiduciary relation exist-
ing between the parties and the sale, considered in the light of the
custom of business, was not a wilful and malicious act as contem-
plated by the statute. Davis v. Aetna Acceptance Co., U. S.
,55 Sup. Ct. 151 (1934).
Conflict exists as to whether a factor is to be considered a "fidu-
ciary" under subdivision 4 of Section 17. One view is that the stat-
ute is broad in scope and is not limited to technical or implied trusts.3
The prevailing theory is that the statute should be thus limited.4 It
is difficult to conceive of factor and principal as being in relation of
trustee and beneficiary, since the factor has the beneficial interest
in the goods and the principal's interest is basically that of a lien.5
In any case, it is well settled that the "fraud" required to render
a claim undischargeable connotes acts of moral turpitude, and not
merely implied or constructive fraud. 6 Thus, even if a factor be
considered as maintaining an express fiduciary relation, where there
is evidence 7 disproving a wrongful intent, the liability would be
dischargeable.
1BANKRUPTCY LAW, 30 Stat. 550 (1898) §17, subd. 4.
'Id. subd. 2.
'Mathieu v. Goldberg, 156 Fed. 541 (D. C. N. Y. 1889); In re Gulick
Halle Co., 186 Fed. 350 (D. C. N. Y. 1911).
"Hennequin v. Clews, 11 U. S. 676, 4 Sup. Ct. 313 (1891); Noble v.
Hammond, 129 U. S. 65, 9 Sup. Ct 235 (1889); Upshur v. Briscoe, 138 U. S.
365, 11 Sup. Ct. 313 (1891); Crawford v. Burke, 195 U. S. 176, 25 Sup. Ct.
9 (1904).
' McIntyre v. Kavanaugh, 210 N. Y. 175, 104 N. E. 135 (1914), aff'd, 242
U. S. 138, 37 Sup. Ct. 38 (1916); 2 WnLISTON, SALES (2d ed. 1924) 437,
p. 1079.
'Neal v. Clark, 95 U. S. 704, 24 L. ed. 586 (1877); Strang v. Bradner,
114 U. S. 555, 5 Sup. Ct. 1038 (1885) ; 7 C. J. 406.
' Instant case.
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Although one recent cases seems to be in opposition, a perusal
of the adjudications interpreting subdivision 2 seems to indicate that
the element necessary to constitute an act "wilful and malicious" is
that the act be done with a design against someone.9 The boundaries
are clearly defined. On the one hand, it is well established that
"malice" does not signify hatred or ill will.' 0 It is not even neces-
sary that the person seeking the discharge should have participated
in," or even have had knowledge of, the act, as in a case where
the liability was incurred by the agent without the consent of the
principal. 12 On the other hand, a mere showing that there has been
a conversion x3 is insufficient to prevent a claim from being dis-
charged. The party opposing the discharge has the burden1 4 of pre-
senting facts showing that the design above stated is present as where
the conversion would amount to a larceny.15 A discharge has been
allowed where the wrongful act was less innocent than that in the
instant case, where a custom of dealing explained the technical con-
version and negatived the existence of the design to injure.' 6
J. O'D.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW--DISMISSAL OF 'COMPLAINT UPON ITS
FAcE-NEcESSITY OF A HEARING UPON EvIDENCE.-The plaintiff
brought suit to enjoin the enforcement of the New York Milk Con-
trol Law of April 10, 1933,' which law authorized the Milk Control
'Brown v. Garey, 241 App. Div. 370, 272 N. Y. Supp. 312 (lst Dept. 1934).
A strong dissenting opinion maintained that the conversion therein was merely
accidental, though negligent, and therefore dischargeable. For discussion of
this case, see 12 N. Y. U. L. Q. 126.
' Tinker v. Colwell, 193 U. S. 473, 24 Sup. Ct. 505 (1904); McIntyre v.
Kavanaugh, supra note 5; lt re Dixon, 21 F. (2d) 565 (1927); In re Vena,
46 F. (2d) 81 (D. C. N. Y. 1909) ; it re Arnao, 210 Fed. 395 (D. 'C. N. Y.
1914) ; Matter of Levitan, 224 Fed. 241 (D. C. N. Y. 1915) ; In re Nordlight,
3 Fed. Supp. 486 (1934); In re Binsky, 6 Fed. Supp. 789 (1934); Ulner v.
Doran, 167 App. Div. 259, 152 N. Y. Supp. 655 (1st Dept. 1915).
10 Tinker v. Colwell, szuPra note 9; Matter of Barbery v. Cohen, 183 App.
Div. 424, 170 N. Y. Supp. 762 (1st Dept. 1919); Couaxa, BANKRUPTCY (11th
ed. 1919) 436.
x' Castle v. Bullard, 23 How. 172 (--); Matter of Peck, 206 N. Y. 55,
99 N. E. 258 (1912).
'tMcIntyre v. Kavanaugh, supra note 5.
" McIntyre v. Kavanaugh, suprG note 5; In re Dixon, supra note 9; In re
Burchfield, 31 Fed. 118 (D. C. N. Y. 1929); li re Ennis & Stoppani, 171 Fed.
755 (D. C. N. Y. 1909) ; Wood v. Fisk, 215 N. Y. 233, 109 N. E. 177 (1915).
14 Kreitlein v. Ferger, 238 U. S. 21, 35 Sup. Ct. 685 (1915); Matter of
Levitan, supra note 9; it re Kneski, 290 Fed. 406 (D. C. N. Y. 1903); Man-
heim v. Loewe, 185 App. Div. 601, 173 N. Y. Supp. 260 (1st Dept. 1918) ; Miles
v. Havens, 198 App. Div. 546, 190 N. Y. Supp. 656 (1st Dept. 1921).
'McIntyre v. Kavanaugh, spra note 5; In re Arnao, supra note 9.
" It re Dixon, supra note 9.
'Laws of 1933, c. 158 (N. Y. AGRICULTURE AND MARKETS LAw §§300-
319).
